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Bargaining Theory Without Tears
by Ken Binmore
1. Introduction.
The purpose of this article is two-fold. The primary aim is to provide a simple proof of a
version of Rubinstein's [15] bargaining theorem in a setting that is sufficiently general to
cover the situations that typically arise in applications. In particular, the feasible set is
not assumed to be convex and a reasonably general view is taken of the manner in which
disagreement may arise.
The secondary aim pursues some points made in Binmore/Rubinstein/Wolinsky [7]. A
detailed analysis of subgame-perfect equilibria in a complicated non-cooperative bargaining
model is unnecessary for most applications. Much heavy computation can be short-circuited
by applying certain simple principles directly rather than deriving them anew each time they
are required. The methodology is illustrated in section 8 for a model of decentralized price
formation.
2. The alternating offers model.
Rather than setting the story directly in utility space, it will be told in terms of the classic
problem of "dividing the dollar". A philanthropist donates a dollar to Adam and Eve on
condition that they are able to agree on how to share it. Disagreement may arise in various
ways. A player may abandon the negotiations in favor of his or her best outside option
leaving the other to do the same. Or the philanthropist may lose patience if agreement is
delayed and withdraw his offer. If either of these eventualities occurs, the negotiations will
be said to have broken down. Even without a breakdown, agreement may not be reached
since it is open to the players to sit at the negotiation table for ever.
The result of bargaining under precisely specified rules will be studied. All action takes
place at times nr (n = 0,1,2...), where r > 0. Adam is active when n is even. Eve is
active when n is odd. If the game has not already ended at time nr > 0, the philanthropist
begins by withdrawing his dollar with probability it = Ar < 1. The game continues with
probability fr = 1 - r. The active player then decides whether to opt out. If the active
player opts in, then he or she continues by making a proposal on how to split the dollar.
The passive player then accepts or refuses. Only after a refusal does the clock advance by
r. The passive player then becomes active and the above sequence of events is repeated.
The game begins at time n = 0 but, in this first period, the steps in which the dollar may
be withdrawn and in which Adam may opt out are skipped. The very first move therefore
consists of Adam's making a proposal. The second move consists of Eve's response. If she
refuses, the sequence of events described in the previous paragraph commences with n = 1.1
I~s of the sequencing in this specification is unimportant to the results. That chosen is largely for
mathematical convenience. H owever, it is important that the active player's opting out decision not occur
immediately after the passive player has refused an offer. Otherwise further equilibria appear (Slhaked [17J).
But a model in which a player cannot leave without hearing one final offer from the opponent seems more
realistic. The anomalous first period allows a more elegant statement of some results since then Adam
will never actually opt out in equilibrium. It is, of course, trivial to extend the analysis using backwards
induction to the case when the first period is not anomalous.
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3. Preferences.
Adam is taken to be player I and Eve to be player II. The set of possible deals is identified
with
S = {w : wi + w2 1}-
Notice that it is assumed that money can be burned or borrowed and transferred freely
between the players. Osborne and Rubinstein [13], for example, assume that such transac-
tions are impossible.2 The point 6 E fZ represents a pair of breakdown payments. These
are the payments that each player will receive if the negotiations break down.3
Player i's utility for the outcome w E Sl at time t is taken to be
u;(w, t) = vi(wi) i, (1)
where the discount factor 6; satisfies 0 < b; i 1. (The corresponding discount rate pi is
defined by 6; = e-P.) To economize on notation, we write Di = 6i. Recall that ir = Ar.
Thus, in what follows, both A= and xr are always functions of r. The function u; : R - IR
is assumed to be continuous and strictly increasing. Its range is an open interval R;. We
take b; = u;(#;). The breakdown point b then lies in R1 x R2 .
The Pareto frontier of the set X of utility pairs available at time 0 is the graph of the
function f defined by
f(x) = V2(1- 1~1(z))
Both f : R1 -+ R2 and its inverse f -1 : R2 -+'R are continuous and strictly decreasing.
Note that b E X so that b2 < f (b1) and bi < f-1(b2).
It remains to discuss how the players 'assess the consequences of the perpetual disagree-
ment outcome D. This is assigned utility u;(D) = 0 so as to be consistent with the result
of allowing t - co in (1). In addition, it is assumed that 0 E 51 x 52 and b > 0.
A situation in which the players use strategies that rule out the possibility of agreement
being reached but do not result in either player ever opting out will be called a deadlock.
A deadlock leads to the outcome D with positive probability only when -r = 0. Otherwise
the expected utility to player i from a deadlock is
xib; +r6b;TrA + rrbi(TrAi) 2 +. .. = 1 . (2)
1 - xrA;
If u1 and u2 are concave, then so is f. It follows that X is convex. If X is not convex,
we specifically do not replace it by its convex hull as is normal practice. It is frequently
unrealistic to suppose that agreement on a lottery is feasible. A union boss, for example,
cannot report to his members that their wage settlement was decided by tossing a coin.
Where lotteries are feasible, O should be replaced by the set of all lotteries with prizes in
1. A simpler theory then results.
2And hence are able to find equilibria in circurnstances when they would not otherwise exist. The
approach taken here seems rnore natural
3The case when different payments are reCeived depending on whether somneone opts out or the dollar is
withdrawn has been considered elsewhere (for example, Binmore/Osborne/Rubinstein (6]). The only new




(1) Fishburn and Rubinstein [9] show that relatively mild assumptions on preference relations
guarantee a utility representation of the form (1). In particular, (1) substitutes in this paper
for the conditions (Al) through (A5) of Osborne and Rubinstein [13]. Their condition (A6)
is not used here.
(2) Expressing the basic problem in terms of "dividing the dollar" clarifies the interpretation but
may obscure the generality of the treatment. All that really matters is the shape of the set
X of feasible utility pairs and the values of 61, 62, r and b. Geometric characterizations
of the equilibrium outcomes in such a setting are easily obtained (Binmore [3]). Algebraic
characterizations, as studied here, require more labor.
(3) If ir> 0, the utility functions must be understood in the sense of Von Neumann and Mor-
genstern. If r = 0, expected utility calculations are not necessary and so any utility function
representation will suffice. This observation permits the study of various cases not obviously
included in the scope of the analysis. In particular, Rubinstein's [15] case of "fixed costs of
disagreement" is accessible. Player i's utility for the deal w at time t is then Ui(w, t) = w; -- y t,
where -yj > 0. Rubinstein's version has to be supplemented here by requiring that, if someone
opts out at time t, then player i gets -7t. One takes u;(w,t) = exp U(w,t) and 6, = e-3.
Then vi(z) = e# is far from concave. Notice that f : (0, oo) -+ (0, oo) is given by f(z) = e/z
and b = (1, 1). The example is useful because it exhibits various pathologies.
4. Stationary subgame-perfect equilibria.
In this section, q and ( are Pareto-efficient deals in Q. The utilities assigned to these deals
at time 0 by the two players are given by yj = v;(rji) and z; = v;((j). Notice that y2 = f(i)
and z2 = 1(z1).
Adam will be assumed to use a pure strategy s that requires him to:
(a) Propose q whenever called upon for a proposal;
(b) Accept ( or better and to refuse anything worse whenever called upon for a response.
Eve will be assumed to use a pure strategy t which has the same properties except that the
roles of 2 and ( are reversed.
When do strategies with these properties constitute a subgame-perfect equilibrium?
The current section explores this question in a series of lemmas. The simple proofs are
relegated to an appendix.
Define m2 : JR -+ IR by
m;(x) = Ai(irb1 + irimax{b;, x}),
and restrict attention to those , and ( for which
y2 = m2 (z2 ) 1
z1= m1(y1) '
These equations express the fact that the passive player will always be indifferent be-
tween accepting and refusing what is proposed.
Lemma 1. If (3) holds, then y1 b1 or z2  bu. Also, z1 & y1 and y/2 z2.
Lemma 2. If y and z satisfy/ (3), then there exists a correspornding subgame-perfect equi-
librium pair (s,t ).
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(The properties given for s and t do not specify whether or not a player should opt out
when the opportunity arises. Adam should opt in if y1  b1 and opt out if y1 < b1 . Eve
should opt in if z2 > b2 and opt out if z2 <b 2 .)
Lemma 3. The pair (y, z) satisfies (3) and hence specifies a stationary subgame-perfect
equilibrium if and only if yi is a zero of the function g : R1 -+ R defined by
g(X) = f(x) - (m2 of omi)(x)
and y2 = f(y 1), z1 = m1(yi), z2 = f(zi).
It will be necessary to investigate the properties of the function g in some detail. Note
to begin with that
f(x) - X2[rb2 + f#f(ALb 1)] , if x 61;
g(x) = f(x) - A2[rb2 + f(zi(irbi + i x))] if b1  x ci;
f(x) - A 2b2 , if x> ci ;
where frci = Li 1f-1(b2) - rbi. The dependence of g on r is not made explicit since it
turns out to be more convenient to study the function G : R1 x (0, oo) -+ R defined by
G(x, r) = r-1 g(x) (4)
when this dependence matters.
Lemma 4. The function g: R1 -+ IR has the following properties:
(a) x < A1b1  => g(z) > 0
(b) x > f-1(z2b2) =>' 9(z) < 0 .
Lemma 5. The function g : R1 -+ R always has a zero in the interval [ A1b1,f~ (A 2b2 )]
and hence a stationary subgame-perfect equilibrium exists.
Proof. This follows from the previous lemma because g is continuous.
5. Non-stationary equilibria.
This section proves a generalized version of a theorem of Rubinstein [15]. The proof follows
Binmore [3], Shaked and Sutton [18] and Binmore, Shaked and Sutton [8].
Let S be the set of all subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes. The first result demon-
strates that S is necessarily a large set when more than one stationary subgame-perfect
equilibrium of the type considered in section 4 exists. In particular, Pareto-inefficient out-
comes lie in S.
Multiple stationary subgame-perfect equilibria exist when the function g : R1-+ R has
more than one zero. Let (a, L) be the strategy pair that corresponds to the smallest zero 2
of g. Let (3i, t) be the strategy pair corresponding to the largest zero 21.
Let T be the set of all feasible payoff pairs z that satisfy x (y1, p2).
Lemma 6. If z 6 T , then there exists a subgame-perfect equilibrium (a, t) in which Adam
proposes a deal { at time 0 worth x and Eve accepts. Thus T C S.
Proof. Three "states of mind", UP, DO WN and MIDDLE are distinguished. Players
begin in the MIDDLE state. In this state, the subgame-perfect equilibrium (a, t) to be
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constructed requires Adam to propose when called upon to make a proposal. Eve accepts
( and anything at least as good as !Z. She refuses anything else.
In the UP state, (s, t) requires that the players play according to (s, i) in the remainder
of the game. In the DOWN state, (s, t) requires playing according to( s, t) in the remainder
of the game.
Once in the UP state, players remain there. The same applies to the DOWN state.
Transitions from the MIDDLE state are made as follows. If Adam proposes f, then a
refusal by Eve shifts both players to the UP state. If Eve refuses any other proposal, both
players shift to the DOWN state.
Why is the schedule for proposal and response in the MIDDLE state optimal? Eve
should accept f because x 2  92 = m2(22). Her response to other proposals is optimal
because she gets y2 = m2(12) from refusing. Adam should propose f because he gets at
most Y-1from deviating and x 1 > y. (If Adam deviates to a proposal that is refused, either
Eve opts out because z2 < b2 or she opts in because z2 > b2. In the latter case, Adam gets
i1(rbi+ frzi 5< 'ii i < z1 . In the former case, he gets 1b1 <bi < 1 by
lemma 4.1.)
Next it will be shown that S C T. A preliminary lemma is needed.
Lemma T. The set Y of all subgame-perfect equilibrium payoffs to Adam is [ , 1].
Proof. Let a = inf Y and A = sup Y. Let Z be the set of all subgame-perfect equilibrium
payoffs to Eve in the companion game in which it is Eve who makes the first proposal at
time 0. Write e = inf Z and E = sup Z.
(1) It is open to Eve to refuse whatever Adam proposes at time 0. If equilibrium
strategies are used in the continuation of the game, then Eve will get an expected payoff
of at least m2(e), because the companion game will be played after a time delay of r
unless the dollar is withdrawn or Eve opts out in the interim. If equilibrium strategies are
used, it follows that Eve gets at least m2(e) and so Adam gets at most f
1(m 2(e)). Thus,
A < f-1(m2(e)) and so
f(A) > m2(e). (5)
On applying a similar argument in the companion game,
E < f(mi(a)). (6)
(2) It is optimal for Eve to accept any proposal from Adam that assigns her a payoff
w > m 2(E), provided that equilibrium strategies are used after a refusal. Thus Adam must
get at least f- 1(w). Hence f- 1(w) is a lower bound for S whenever to > m2(E). Thus
a > f- 1(m2(E)) and so
f(a) < m2(E). (7)
On applying a similar argument in the companion game,
e>2 f(m1(A)). (8)
(3) From (5) and (8),
f(A) m2(e) (m2 ofo mi)(A)
and hence g(A)>2 0. But g(x) < 0 for x > #1 Thus A < 91. But 91i E Y and so A =91
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From (6) and (7),
f(a) m2(E) (m2ofoml)(a)
and hence g(a) < 0. But g(x) > 0 for x < y1 . Thus a > y1 . But y1 E Y and so a = y1 .
(4) It remains to confirm that 1 iy <1 implies y1 E Y. This follows immediately
from lemma 5.1.
Theorem 1. S = T.
Proof. By the preceding lemma, Adam's equilibrium payoffs lie in the set [M1,i]. Sim-
ilarly, Eve's equilibrium payoffs in the companion game lie in [22,z2]. It follows that her
equilibrium payoffs in the original game lie in [g2, y2 ], since g2 = m2(z 2) andy2 = m2(12).
Thus S C T. On the other hand, lemma 5.1 shows that T C S.
Notes:
(1) When multiple equilibria exist, there may be subgame-perfect equilibria in which agreement
is not reached immediately.
The second and third notes concern two cases of special interest considered by Rubinstein [15]. The
reason that the conclusions quoted differ from his is because the bargaining models considered are
not identical.
(2) In the notation of section 3, take v1(x) = v2(z) = z and 7r = 0. Then R1 = R2 = JR and
f(x) = 1 - z. The zeros of the function g are the stationary subgame-perfect equilibrium
outcomes for Adam. In this case, g is strictly decreasing. It follows that there is a unique
equilibrium outcome. If u = (1 - A2 )/(1 - A1A2 ) satisfies bi < u i A'1(1 - b2 ), then
Adam gets u. If u < b1, then Adam will be planning to take his outside option should the
opportunity arise. He gets 1 - A 2(1 - A1b1) when proposing. If u > Aj'(1 - b2), Eve is
planning to take her outside option. Adam gets 1 - A2b2 .
(3) The second case of interest is described in note 3 of section 3. When A 1 > A2 , g has a unique
zero at A2 . In terms of money payoffs, this means that, when Yi < 72, Adam gets 1 +72r
in equilibrium. (Eve plans to take her outside option.) When Ai <A 2, g has a unique zero
at A 1A21. In terms of money payoffs this means that, when 71 < 72, Adam gets (72 - 71)r
in equilibrium. (Adam plans to take his outside option.) When A1 = A 2 = A, g is zero on
[1,eA 1]. Thus, with the notation of section 4, y = 1 and 1 = eA-1. Hence g2 = A. Any
feasible pair z (1, A) is therefore an equilibrium outcome. In terms of money payoffs this
means that, when 7i = 72 = 7, the set of equilibrium outcomes is {w: w: + w2 < 1, wi
0,w 2 2 -77}.
6. Generalized Nash bargaining solutions.
Much of the interest of the bargaining model described in the previous sections lies in the
fact that, in the limit as r -+ 0+, the equilibrium outcomes can be characterized in terms
of a suitably generalized version of Nash's bargaining solution. The case r -~ 0+ deserves
special emphasis for at least two reasons. The first reason is that there will often be nothing
that constrains players to keep to the timetable specified in the model. After refusing a
proposal, they will then wish to make a counterproposal at the earliest possible opportunity.4
The second reason is that Adam's first-mover advantage disappears in the limit as r -~ 0+.
'The limiting factors will then be physical or physiological. Modeling these will involve a reinterpretation
of 6 i and 62.
6
In this section, a generalized Nash bargaining solution will be described. Axiomatizations
of the point-valued version can be found in Kalai [11], Roth [14] and elsewhere.
An abstract bargaining problem will be identified with a triple (X, b, d) in which X is
interpreted as the set of feasible payoff pairs, b is a breakdown point whose coordinates are
the players' outside options, and d is a deadlock point. As in section 2, R1 and R2 are open
intervals, f : R1 -+ R2 is a strictly decreasing surjection and X = {(x 1, x 2 ) E R1 x R2 :
x 2 < f(x 1)}. Also 0 E -1 x R2 and 0 < d < b E X. For the remainder of the paper it will
also be assumed that f is twice differentiable on R1.
A generalized Nash product with bargaining powers a > 0 and # > 0 is defined to be
an expression of the form
P(xi, x 2 ) = (x1 - d1)"(x 2 - d2)'3 . (9)
When X is convex and b = d, the regular Nash bargaining solution introduced by Nash [12]
identifies the solution of (X, d, d) with the point n at which the Nash product P with a = /3
is maximized subject to the constraints x E X and x > d.
When X is not convex, a more elaborate definition is necessary. Let p: R1 -+ R be
given by
p(x) = P(x,f(x)). (10)
Attention will be restricted to the case in which p'(x) is zero neither at an endpoint of the
interval [b1, f- 1 (b2)], nor at an interior point x where p"(x) = 0. Only pathological cases
are excluded by this restriction. The function H : R1 -> R is defined by
1+oo0, - if x< b1
H(x) = f'(x) ~ + (x) d2 , if b 1 <x< f-1(b2 )
-oo0, if x > f-1(b2).
This has the same sign as p' on the interval [b1, f-
1(b2)]. A 'zero' of H will be understood
to be any point z E R1 which has the property that all of its neighborhoods contain both
positive and negative values of H. In view of the preceding restrictions on p, a 'zero' of H is
either an interior point z of [b1, f-1(b2)] at which H(z) = 0, or an endpoint of the interval.
A Nash bargaining point n can now be defined to be a Pareto-efficient point of X
for which n1 is a 'zero' of H. Of all Nash bargaining points, let n be that which assigns
Adam the greatest payoff (and Eve the least). Let n be that which assigns Eve the greatest
payoff (and Adam the least). The generalized Nash bargaining solution corresponding to
the bargaining powers a > 0 and 3> 0 for the bargaining problem (X, b, d) is the set N of
all feasible payoff pairs x 2 (n1, 12). The definition is illustrated in figure 1.
Proposition 1. The point n is the local maximum of the Nash product (9) subje:t to x E X
and z > b that assigns Adam the greatest payoff. The point A is the local maximum that
assigns Eve the greatest payoff.
Proposition 2. A suffcient condition that N consist of a single point is that
(x - d1)f'(z) be concave on [b1, f~1(b2)]. In particular, it is suffcient if f is concave and
so X is convex.
Proof. The condition implies that H is strictly decreasing on [bi, f-1(b2 )].
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Figure 1: A generalized Nash bargaining solution.
7. The Nash program.
The aim of the Nash program is to provide non-cooperative justifications, where possible,
for the solution concepts of cooperative game theory. (See, for example, the introduction
to Binmore/Dasgupta [4].) The alternating offers model of sections 2-5 is important in this
context since it provides a defense for the Nash bargaining solution.
Theorem 2. As r -+ 0, the set of subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes in the alternating
offers model converges to the generalized Nash bargaining solution N corresponding to the
bargaining powers a = 1/(A + p1) and 0 = 1/(A + P2) for the bargaining problem (X,b,d),
in which the deadlock payoff di = Abi/(A + pi) is the limiting value of (2) as r -+ 0+.
Proof. It will be shown that the set of values of x for which the function G defined by (4)
is zero converges to the set of 'zeros' of the function H defined in the preceding section.
The first step is the observation that, for each z E R1,
G(x,r)-+ H(x) as r-+0+.
On the interval [b1, f-(b 2)], this follows from L'H6pital's rule because c1 > f
1 (b2). Out-
side the interval, one may appeal to lemma 4.4 to determine the sign of G.
(1) Every neighborhood of a 'zero' of H contains a zero of G, provided r is sufficiently
small. With the restrictions introduced in section 6, each such neighborhood contains a
point at which H is positive and a point at which H is negative. The same is therefore
true of G if r is sufficiently small. Since G is continuous, it follows that G has a zero in the
neighborhood.
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(2) Every neighborhood that contains zeros of G for all sufficiently small r also contains
a 'zero' of H. The interval [b1, f -(b2)] is compact, and hence G converges uniformly to
H on this interval. This observation takes care of neighborhoods centered at points of
(b1 , f-1(b2)). A trivial argument extends the conclusion to neighborhoods centered at the
endpoints.
In summary, where the defense of the use of the Nash bargaining theory is to be based
on an alternating offers model,5 the "status quo" should correspond to the consequences
of a deadlock (during which the players remain at the negotiation table but never reach
an agreement). The outside options that they may obtain by abandoning the negotiations
serve only as constraints on the range of validity of the Nash bargaining solution. Often, it
is convenient to apply these principles to payoff flows. In a wage negotiation, for example,
the deadlock flows may be the income per period for the two sides during a strike.
The final result of this section is offered without a proof. It provides a criterion for
the uniqueness of an equilibrium in the alternating offers model that does not depend on r
being small.
Proposition 3. A necessary condition that the alternating offers model have a unique
subgame-perfect equilibrium is that N consist of a single point.
Notes:
Some special cases of theorem 7.1 deserve mention. In each case, X is assumed to be convex so
that N consists of a single point.
(1) P1 = P2 = 0. In this case, the equilibrium outcome converges to the regular Nash bargaining
solution for the problem (X,b, b). Here the breakdown and deadlock points are the same and
there is no difficulty in deciding on an appropriate "status quo" in using Nash's theory. This
case arises when it is not impatience that motivates an early agreement but fear that the
opportunity to reach an agreement may disappear if an agreement is delayed.
(2) pi = P2 = p > 0. In this case, the equilibrium outcome converges to the regular Nash
bargaining solution for the problem (X, b, d), where d = Ab/(A + p). Note the displacement of
the "status quo" from b. In symmetric situations, this displacement leaves the location of the
Nash bargaining solution unaltered. Models that mistakenly place the "status quo" at b will
therefore nevertheless lead to the correct conclusions in symmetric situations.
(3) A = 0. In this case, the equilibrium outcome converges to an asymmetric Nash bargaining
solution with bargaining powers a = 1/pi and = f1/P2 for the problem (X, b, 0). Recall that
the payoff pair 0 corresponds to the perpetual disagreement point D which therefore serves as
the appropriate "status quo" under these circumstances. This case arises when the players are
unconcerned about the risk of losing the opportunity to reach an agreement and are motivated
simply by their impatience with delays.
8. Decentralized price formation.
To illustrate the principles of the preceding section, a model will now be studied in which the
price at which a good is traded is determined by bargaining between buyers and sellers rather
than through some centralized auctioneering mechanism. Insofar as there is an innovation
as compared with Rubinstein/Wolinsky [16], Gale [10] or Binmore/Herrero [5], it lies in the
more realistic modeling of the circumstances of a bargaining breakdown. Wolinsky [20] and
Bester [1] consider other variants of the model.
5Rather than, for example, Nash's [12] own model in which players simultaneously make take-it-or-
leave-it offers.
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Each seller owns a house. If he sells the house at time t for price p, his utility is p6l.
The buyer gets (1 - p)61. An agent who opts out of the market or who never succeeds in
consummating a deal gets zero utility. After a sale, the buyer and seller leave the market,
but are immediately replaced by a new buyer and a new seller so that things remain in a
steady state. The market therefore always contains a pool of unmatched agents looking for
a bargaining partner.
The price at which the house is exchanged is determined by bargaining between individ-
ual buyers and sellers who have succeeded in finding each other. The bargaining model is
based on that of section 2, but various modifications are necessary. In particular, account
needs to be taken of buyers and sellers who have yet to find a bargaining partner. Such
unmatched agents are always deemed to be active.
At the beginning of each time period, all active agents are matched with a new partner
with probability Air > 0 (i = 1,2). A player who was passive in the preceding period and
refused the proposal made by his or her partner may therefore have two partners in the
current period. Such a player is in a powerful position because this creates an auctioning
scenario.6 The modeling of this scenario is discussed below. The next event is a decision
by active players on whether or not to opt out. An unmatched player may opt out of the
market altogether. A matched active player may do the same or abandon his or her current
partner and so become unmatched. If a matched active player opts in, he or she makes
a proposal that the passive player may accept or refuse. Before further events, the clock
advances by r. Any remaining passive players become active and the cycle of events is
repeated.
This is a more complex problem than that discussed in preceding sections, but a full
non-cooperative analysis will not be described. Instead, the result of such an analysis will
be predicted using the principles outlined in section 7. These apply only in the limiting
case when r -+ 0+ (the case of 'no bargaining frictions'). The prediction is framed in terms
of an appropriate Nash bargaining solution of an appropriate bargaining problem (X, b, d).
Note first that the average probability that bilateral bargaining will break down during a
period of length r is Ar = z(A1 + A2)r. The appropriate bargaining powers are therefore
a = 1/(A + p1) and # = 1/(A + P2). The feasible set X is the unit simplex. The value of the
generalized Nash bargaining solution is therefore a payoff pair of the form (p,1 - p), where
p is the price at which the house is sold. Agreement on this price will be immediate when
a buyer and seller get matched.
The seller's outside option b1 is alp/(A1 +p1). Similarly, b2 = A2(1-p)/(A2 +p 2). Notice
that, since b1 < p and b2 < 1 - p, no player opts out in equilibrium. It remains to consider
the deadlock point d. Matters are less simple than in section 7. We take
= 1
di = {A( ) +5 1 A1(1 - b2)}
2(p1+A)
The assumption is that, when two sellers are matched simultaneously with one buyer, the
house is sold at a price equal to a seller's outside option b1. The buyer then gets 1 -bi
Similarly, if two buyers are matched with one seller.7 The deadlock payoffs are then
6 Usually, this possibility is neglected by assuming that the rejection of a proposal or the discovery of a
new partner dissolves the partnership.
7The auction envisaged can be modeled as a non-cooperative game as in Binmnore [2] or Wilson [19].
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calculated by considering the consequences of a matched buyer and seller continuing to
negotiate without reaching agreement until one finds a second partner.
The equilibrium price is then found by solving the equation
p E=(1 -d2) + 0 di.-
In the case when P1 = P2 = p, p = (A1 + p)/2(A + p), and so the unit of surplus gets divided
in the ratio (A1 +p): (A2 + p). This is the conclusion reached in Rubinstein/Wolinsky [16].8
Opting out plays no role in the preceding discussion. One may, however, follow Gale
[10] and enrich the model by replacing the assumption that agents get zero utility from
leaving the market by something more realistic. To this end, continuous, strictly increasing
functions S : [0,1] -+ 1R and B : [0,1] -+ IR are introduced. In each period, it is assumed
that S(1)r and B(1)r are the measures of sellers and buyers who appear in the market in
one period.9 The quantity S(xi)r is interpreted as the measure of these new sellers who can
get a utility of at most x1 outside the market. A similar interpretation applies to B(x 2)r.
For a steady-state equilibrium, the measures of new buyers and sellers who choose not
to opt out by leaving the market must be equal. In the limiting case as r -+ 0+, this
reduces to the requirement that S(b1) = B(b2). The measures S* and B* of sellers and
buyers in the market at the beginning of a period will consist of S(b1) and B(b2) together
with those sellers and buyers who were in the market in the previous period but did not
get matched. (A matched pair will agree immediately in equilibrium.) The values S* and
B* need to be related to the rates A1 and A2 at which agents are matched. One of many
possible assumptions is that there is a fixed constant k > 0 for which
kB* kS*
S* + B* A2  S* + B*
The measure of sellers who get matched in a period and hence leave the market after
concluding a deal is then rkS*B*/(S* + B*). This is equal to the measure of buyers who
get matched in the same period. For a steady-state, it is therefore necessary that
S(b1) = B(b2 ) = kS*B*/(S* + B*). (11)
The principle that a bargainer's outside option acts only as a constraint on the range of
validity of the bargaining solution is now applied. The conclusion is that the analysis that
led to the equilibrium price p in the case when outside options were zero remains valid. The
players do not even need to be informed of their partner's outside option.
In the case p1 = P2 = p, the value of the equilibrium price was given in terms of A1 and
A2 . This allows b1 and b2 to be calculated in terms of a1 and A2 . However, A1 and A2 are
functions of S* and B* and so the model can be solved.
When p -+ 0+ (the case of 'no search frictions'), bI and b2 reduce to p and 1- p respec-
tively. The equations q = S(p) and q = B(1 - p) can then be interpreted as defining supply
and demand curves. The equilibrium price p is then simply the Walrasian price. Note,
however, that the "law of one price" applies even when search frictions are not negligible.
It is interesting to explore the manner in which models like that discussed here relate to
classical intuitions about price formation. However, my own view is that the value of such
8But note that the same conclusion would not be reached if P1 # p2 because the breakdown assumptions
differ.
*They appear after the matching move but before the opting out move.
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models lies more in their capacity to provide insight into situations which are not amenable
to a classical approach because relevant frictions cannot be dismissed as negligible.
9. Conclusion.
This paper has largely been an attempt to convince the reader that the material it covers
is fairly straight-forward as a piece of theory. However, one does not need to penetrate
very deeply into the theory in order to be able to apply the principles to which it leads. In
particular, a wide variety of matching-and-bargaining models is amenable to the analysis
outlined in section 8.
12
APPENDIX
This appendix contains proofs of the lemmas of Section 4 in those cases where the proofs
are not immediate.
Proof of Lemma 1. If y1 < b1 , then z1 = A1b1  61. Since z is Pareto-efficient, it
therefore cannot be that x2 <b2. If Y1 > bi, then zi = Di(fry1 -+ bi) < 1y 1  y1. Thus,
z2 = f(zi) f(y1) = y2. A similar argument applies if z2 b2.
Proof of Lemma 2. It needs to be confirmed that proposing decisions are optimal. They
are optimal because the active player cannot demand more without being refused, and he
or she prefers not to be refused. In checking this last point, lemma 4.1 makes all the cases
immediate except for that in which the active player opts out in equilibrium. Suppose, in
particular, that y1 bi and z2 < 62. Then y2 = 0262. Hence,
z2 2 2 = A2(2b2 _A 2 (iAzb2 + 7rb2) = A2(iriy2 +- b 2).
It follows that Eve prefers z to be accepted than to have her proposal refused. A similar
argument applies when y1 < b1 and z2 > b2.
Proof of Lemma 4. (a) If x <A0161, then
9(X) > f(i bi) - A2[rb2 +- rf(ibi )]
= (1- A2 r)f(Aibi)- A2irb2
> (1 - .2r)b2 - A2ib2
= b2 (1-A 2 ) >0-
(b) If x > f 1 (A 2b2 ), then f(x) < L 2b2. If it is also true that g(x) 0, then
O252 - O2[7xb2 + rf(A1(7rbi + frx))] > 0
b2 > f(-1(bfbb+mr))
f -1(b2) < A1(r b1 + frz)
z > Cl.
Now suppose that f- 1 (A 2b2) < c1. Then g(x) < 0 for f'(A 2b2) < x < c1. Hence,
g(x) < 0 for x > f 1 (d 2b2 ), because g is continuous and decreases on [c1, oo). On the other
hand, if f- 1( 2b2) > ci, then x > f'(A 2b2) implies g(x) = f(x) - A2b2 < 0.
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